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Abstract 
The question to what extent corruption influences suicide remains still unanswered. This paper 
examines the effect of corruption on suicide using a panel data approach for 24 OECD countries 
over the period 1995-1999. Our results indicate suicide rates are lower in countries with lower levels 
of corruption. We also find evidence that this effect is approximately three times larger for males 
than for females. It follows that corruption has a detrimental effect on societal well-being. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Ideally, governments can be expected to improve quality of life and increase well-being by 
preventing market failure. In the real world, this does not hold true. Since the seminal work of 
Mauro (1995) showing that corruption hampers economic growth, a growing number of studies have 
investigated the impact of corruption on various facets of society
3
. Recently, researchers have paid 
attention to a more fundamental issue by examining the association between governance and 
well-being (Helliwell and Huang, 2008; Fischer and Rodríguez, 2008; Ott 2010, among others).  
Self-reported measures of subjective well-being are often criticized for lack of reliability and 
validity (for example, Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001). Koivumaa et al. (2001) provided evidence 
that there is a high correlation between suicide and subjective well-being at individual and aggregate 
levels. Unlike self-reported measures, suicide data
4
 are more frequently used in cross-country 
comparisons. Self-reported data comparisons are difficult because of problems with interpersonal 
comparisons of utility. Indeed, Daly and Wilson (2009) asserted that the determinants of well-being 
are the same determinants of suicide, using data for the United States. Thus, suicide rate is thought to 
be an appropriate proxy for well-being. Using suicide rates as an indicator of societal well-being has 
a great advantage in that they are a more reliable and objective indicator of well-being compared 
with self-reported well-being measures (Helliwell, 2007). However, few researchers have attempted 
to examine the association between suicide and quality of governance. In the present study, we 
investigate the effect of corruption on suicide rates. Thus, this corruption index reflects the quality of 
a country’s institutions. For that purpose, we used a simple fixed effects model to conduct estimation 
                                                   
3 For instance, it has been found that corruption has a detrimental effect on the damage 
from natural disasters (Kahn, 2005; Escaleras et al., 2007). Corruption causes traffic 
accidents (Anbarci et al., 2006). Corruption is negatively related to access to improved 
drinking water and adequate sanitation (Anbarci et al., 2009) and leads to reductions in 
public spending on education and health (Delavallade, 2006). 
4 The term suicide refers to completed suicides throughout this paper, unless noted 
otherwise. 
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for 24 OECD countries. In the sections that follow, we present the data and empirical model and 
estimation results. The paper concludes with a summary of our findings. 
 
II. DATA AND EMPIRICAL MODEL  
This study used a panel data set covering a 5-year period (1995–1999). As shown in the Appendix, 
Table A1, 24 OECD countries were included. The data used were extracted from several sources. 
Annual suicide deaths were extracted from the WHO Mortality Database (past update Dec 2009)
5
 
which contains data for number of deaths by year, country, age group, and sex as well as cause of 
death. One important issue is that suicide can be misclassified. Hence, measurement error in the 
suicide statistics can be an issue. Data on the number of undetermined deaths are available and we 
could also conduct robustness analysis. We used the corruption perception index (CPI) developed by 
Transparency International (TI) as a proxy for the degree of corruption
6
. That is, higher values of 
CPI indicated lower corruption. This index was collected from Transparency International
7
. The CPI 
has been widely used to measure cross-country corruption (for examples, see Lambsdorff 2006)
8
. 
Some authors argue that indices based on perceptions reflect the quality of a country’s institutions 
(Andvig 2005). Among the set of explanatory variables included were: per capita income, economic 
inequality, unemployment rates, divorce rates, total alcohol consumption, fertility rates, and total 
population. As a measure of income, we used the per capita real gross domestic product (INCOM) in 
                                                   
5 Available at http://www.who.int/whosis/mort/download/en/index.html (accessed May 
10, 2010). 
6 An important issue is how to define corruption. There are many definitions. Most 
share a common denominator which can be expressed as follows: “the abuse of public 
authority or position for private gains.” The data are available at 
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi (accessed February 2, 
2011). 
7 The SIDD adjusts the raw World Income Inequality Database (WIID) for differences 
in scope of coverage, income definition, and reference unit to a nationally representative, 
gross income, household per capita standard. 
8 Another corruption indicator is that from the International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG). This ICRG index of corruption might be problematic as it does not measure a 
country’s level of corruption but the political risk involved in corruption. 
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the year 2000 in international dollars taken from the Penn World Tables (PWT v 6.3)
9
. Economic 
inequality (GINI) was proxied by the Gini coefficient which was taken from the Standardized 
Income Distribution Database (SIDD) created by Babones and Alvarez-Rivadulla (2007)
10
. 
Harmonized unemployment rates (UNEMP) were taken from the OECD database to allow for 
comparisons across countries. We also employed crude divorce rates (per 1,000 people) (DIV) taken 
from the United Nations Common Database, Demographic Yearbook
11
. Total recorded per capita 
alcohol consumption (ALCO) was obtained from the Global Information System on Alcohol and 
Health (GISAH) of the World Health Organization (WHO)
12
. Total fertility rates (FERTIL) were 
taken from the World Development Indicators Database (World Bank 2006). Lastly, mid-year total 
population (POP) was taken from the WHO Mortality Database. 
The empirical model to explain suicide rates and analyze the impact of corruption on suicide 
takes the following form:  
 
SUICI(MSUICI, FSUICI) it =α1 CORRUPT it  + α2 ALCOit  + α3 GINI it  +α4 INCOM it  
+ α5 UNEMP it +α6 DIVit +α7 FERTILit +α8 ln(POP)it +mt+ ki +εit,  (1) 
where dependent variables in country i and year t are total suicide rates as SUICIit (male and female 
suicide rates). mt represents unobservable year specific effects such as macro-level shock at t years. 
ki and εit represent individual effects of country i (a fixed effect country vector) and the error term of 
country i and year t, respectively. The structure of the data set used in this study is a panel; mt is 
controlled by incorporating year dummies. ki holds the time invariant feature. So we can use the 
fixed effects model to capture ki (Baltagi 2005). The fixed effects allow to control for differences in 
                                                   
9 The data are available at http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt_index.php (accessed 
January 15, 2010). 
10 The data are available at http://salvatorebabones.com/data-downloads (accessed 
March 1, 2011). 
11 Available at http://data.un.org/Default.aspx (Accessed May 10, 2010). 
12 Available at http://apps.who.int/globalatlas/default.asp (Accessed May 10, 2010). 
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national characteristics such as culture, religious concepts about death or life across nations, climate 
and traditional values, and in periodical characteristics such as changes in social acceptance to 
suicide. The regression parameters to be estimated are α; and εit represents the classical error term. If 
CORRUPT takes 10, this indicates an absence of corruption. On the other hand, if CORRUPT takes 
0, business transactions in the country are entirely dominated by kickbacks and extortion, for 
example. CORRUPT was included to capture the degree of governance corruption. If people are less 
likely to commit suicide in less corrupt societies, CORRUPT will take the negative sign. One of the 
reasons to employ a fixed effects model is that is a closed sample (homogenous) and we do not 
extrapolate these results to other set of countries. We also expect some correlation between the 
individual effects and some of the explanatory variables. What about the results of Hausman test? 
Following the suicide literature, we include several socioeconomic variables on the right hand 
side of our regression models (e.g. Brainerd 2001, Kunce and Anderson 2002, Andrés 2005, Chuang 
and Huang 2007, Chen et al., 2009; Noh 2009, Yamamura 2010). To begin, economic factors were 
captured by per capita income (INCOM), unemployment rate (UNEMP), and Gini index (GINI). 
Social factors were controlled for by divorce rates (DIV), total alcohol consumption (ALCO), and 
fertility rates (FERTIL). Lastly, we control for the corresponding total populations to account for 
country size
13
. Table 1 provides definitions and descriptive statistics of the variables. 
 
III. ESTIMATION RESULTS.  
Results for the fixed effects models are given in Table 2, each corresponding to another 
dependent variable (total, male, and female suicide rates). Regressions using the male suicide rates 
as dependent variable are very similar to those on total suicide rates because males account for the 
bulk of suicides. As indicated at the bottom of Table 2, the R squared values are higher in the models 
                                                   
13 Using adjusted suicide rates to control for differences in the structure of population is 
equivalent to regress the crude rate and control for age structure of population. 
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in which the dependent variable is the total and male suicide rates. One might also conclude that 
male suicide behaviour could be more responsive to socioeconomic conditions as opposed to female 
behaviour. For the sake of brevity, we have focus on concentrated our focus on results for 
CORRUPT and results where coefficients were statistically significant. As Table 2 shows the degree 
of corruption is consistently negatively associated with suicide rates (in all regression models).. 
Furthermore, its coefficient magnitudes are higher for total and male suicide rates than for female 
suicide rates. In particular, the  absolute value of CORRUPT coefficient was 0.65, suggesting that a 
1 point increase in CORRUPT resulted in a 0.62 point decrease in suicide rates. The absolute value 
of CORRUPT was 0.99 for male suicide rate, whereas the value was only 0.33 for female suicide 
rate. This implies that a 1 point increase in CORRUPT resulted in a 0.99 point decrease in male 
suicide rate, while a 1 point increase in CORRUPT resulted in a 0.33 point decrease in female 
suicide rate. Hence, the effect of CORRUPT on male suicide rate was approximately three times 
larger than that for female suicide rate. Regarding other control variables, our results are similar to 
many other previous empirical studies using panel data. We found significant effects of divorce rate 
on male suicides, and it has little effect on female suicide. Alcohol consumption is positively 
associated with suicide rates, regardless of gender. Unemployment, income inequality and fertility 
rates are found to be statistically insignificant in all regression models (for instance, Minoiu and 
Andrés, 2008). 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Although suicide research is a multidisciplinary subject and socioeconomic factors are well 
documented risk factors for suicide. Past research has neglected the role of quality governance 
indicators. In particular, this study explored how corruption influences suicide rate using a panel 
dataset for 24 OECD countries. Empirical results from the fixed effects estimation revealed that 
7 
 
suicide rates are lower in countries with lower levels of corruption. Furthermore, its coefficient 
magnitude is higher for male suicide rates than for female suicide rates. This implies that corruption 
has a detrimental effect on social well-being.  
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Table 1 
Variable definitions, means, and standard deviations (Observations = 102). 
Variables Definition Mean Standard 
Deviation 
SUICI Suicide rate (per 100,000) 14.5 6.4 
MSUICI Male suicide rate (per 100,000) 21.4 9.4 
FSUIC Female suicide rate (per 100,000) 7.8 4.1 
CORRUPT Degree of corruption 7.6 1.7 
ALCO Recorded adult per capita alcohol consumption (in 
liters) 
10.7  3.0 
GINI Gini coefficient 0.42 0.11 
INCOM Per capita income ($1000 US) 23.2 7.0 
UNEMP Unemployment rate (%) 7.4 3.6 
DIV Crude divorce rate (per 1,000; %) 2.0 0.9 
FERTIL Fertility rate, total (births per woman)     1.6      0.2 
POP Mid-year population (millions)    37.2     58.9 
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Table 2 
Panel data regression models. Fixed effects approach.  
Explanatory 
variables 
(1) 
Dependent variable: 
Total suicide rate 
(2) 
Dependent variable: 
Male suicide rate 
(3) 
Dependent variable: 
Female suicide rate 
CORRUPT -0.65** 
(-2.00) 
-0.99* 
(-1.95) 
-0.33* 
(-1.70) 
ALCO 2.05*** 
(4.65) 
3.26*** 
(4.79) 
0.89*** 
(3.38) 
GINI 5.83 
 (0.83) 
13.6 
 (1.27) 
-1.69 
 (-0.41) 
INCOM -0.49** 
       (-2.23) 
-0.86** 
       (-2.55) 
-0.14 
       (-1.06) 
UNEMP  0.21 
(1.21) 
 0.25 
(0.97) 
 0.16 
(1.59) 
DIV 2.33** 
(2.45) 
4.33*** 
(2.95) 
0.38 
(0.67) 
FERTIL -0.84 
(-0.24) 
-2.97 
(-0.55) 
1.22 
(0.59) 
Ln(POP) 
 
0.41 
(1.58) 
0.57 
(1.41) 
0.27* 
(1.74) 
R-squared (Within) 0.39 0.41 0.32 
No. of observations 102 102 102 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10, 5 and 1 
percent levels, respectively. Year and country dummies are included in all estimations, but to save 
space are not reported.  
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APPENDIX.  
Table A1. OECD countries in the regression analysis   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Australia Japan 
Austria Luxembourg 
Belgium Netherlands 
Canada New Zealand 
Denmark Norway 
Finland Portugal 
France South Korea 
Germany Spain 
Greece Sweden 
Iceland Switzerland 
Ireland United Kingdom 
Italy United States 
